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One commonly observed phenomena about taxation in Africa are regional differences and the 
fact that southern African countries have higher levels of shares of taxation in GDP. This article 
argues that the major source of differences in ‘tax effort’ is the colonial histories of various 
countries. Using standard measures of ‘tax effort in a panel data framework and dividing colonial 
Africa along forms of incorporation into the colonial system, it shows that African countries and 
others with similar colonial histories have higher levels of ‘tax effort’. However, the difference 
disappears when we control for the colonial factor. These results hold under different model 
specifications.  
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On Tax Efforts and Colonial Heritage in Africa 
Thandika Mkandawire 
LSE, London and IFS, Stockholm, 2009 
Africa’s colonial past, and its implications for the continent’s contemporary societies and 
economies, has been a central concern since independence among historians and political 
economists, especially those of a Marxist/nationalist persuasion (Amin 1972;Beckman 
1981;Boahen 1985;Young 1988). Neoclassical economists’ ‘discovery’ of ‘institutions’, 
especially through the seminal work of Douglas North (1990;1997), has generated interest 
in the ‘path dependence’ among  more orthodox analyses associated with neo-
institutionalism, and has revived attention to the colonial past of developing countries. 
Researchers working in this vein now look at how colonial culture, forms of colonisation, 
legal systems and institutional heritage have shaped the ‘initial conditions’ of African 
economies  and continue to have an impact on, current economic performance 
(Acemoglu, et al. 2001;Austin 2008;Bolt and Bezemer 2009;Bowden and Mosley 
2008;Engerman, et al. 2005;Grier 1999;Lange 2004.;Moradi 2008). The colonial state 
was, if anything, a surplus extraction regime and systems of taxation were a defining 
characteristic of various forms of colonisation even by the same imperial power. Forms of 
incorporation particular to different forms of colonisation determined who was taxed, at 
what amount, in what form, for what purposes, and by whom.  
In this paper, we seek to explain a widely observed feature of African economies, namely 
the  significant differences in the share of tax revenue in GDP. We look at the historical 
process of integration of indigenous populations into the colonial order, giving special 
attention to the structures of labour markets in the region and to the revenue needs of 
colonial governments. The end of colonialism left an institutional and infrastructural 
residue that still plays a major role in the determination of tax policies and the capacity to 
collect tax and that accounts for the differences in tax performance. By extending the 
conventional model used in the comparative measurement of tax efforts, we argue that, 
controlling for standard ‘tax handles’
1 such as structural features as levels of development 
and industrialisation or policy variables such as aid, the differences in tax ratios reflect 
differences in colonial heritage. Once this historical fact is also controlled for, the 
observed relationship between tax ratios and tax efforts disappear. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section one introduces a classification of African 
countries that is derived from various historians and from which we will obtain the key 
regressor of our analysis as a dummy variable. In the second section we present the 
empirical models and the data, and conduct the econometric analysis. Some concluding 
remarks are offered in section three.  
1. Taxation in Africa 
Revenue collection varies across Africa along a whole range of classifications. One 
simple classification is along regional lines, as used by international organisations. This 
classification shows that countries of Southern Africa tend to have higher shares of tax 
revenue in GDP than other regions. There have been many explanations for this high tax 
share in the Southern African region. Some have attributed it to the Southern African 
Customs Union, in which South Africa collects customs duties and makes compensatory 
transfers to other members of the Union (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam 1997). However, 
some of the other countries with high tax ratios are not members of the Union. Others 
have suggested that the ease of levying taxes on the mining industry plays an important 
role. This explanation may be valid for Zambia, Namibia and Botswana but cannot 
explain the case of other countries of the region, such as Malawi, which has a relatively 
high tax ratios even without a mining industry. Still others have suggested that the 
differences could simply be the result of ‘institutional spillover’ whereby the tax 
administration practices of the more advanced country (in this case South Africa) spread 
to its neighbours, either through a contagion effect or through shared tax arrangements 
such as customs union (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam 1997)
2. This begs the questions of 
what determined the limits of spillover, and why, for example, Kenya’s settler legacy did 
not spill over to Tanzania and Uganda. Another classification that appears in the literature 
simply groups countries by the origins of the erstwhile colonial power, or by currency 
zones (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam 1997). While this might explain the differences in tax 
collection between Francophone and Anglophone Africa, for example, it does not explain 
the differences among countries within each of these groups. 
A fruitful way of understanding these differences would lean towards a more sociological 
and historical inquiry into the social processes behind taxation and public finance, or to 
‘fiscal sociology’ generally attributed to Joseph Schumpeter (Campbell 1993). As Bird 
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and Zolt and Bird argue, ‘Where a country ends up in terms of both tax level and tax 
structure depends in large part on where it begins. To put it another way, how fiscal 
systems develop depends significantly on how they started’ (Bird and Zolt 2005: 24). We 
therefore begin by looking at the various forms of integration of African economies into 
the colonial order. We start with Samir Amin’s (1972) division of Africa into three 
groups: (1) ‘Africa of the colonial economy’ (économie de traite), also known as the cash 
crop economies; (2) ‘Africa of the concessionary companies’; and (3) ‘Africa of the 
labour reserves’. In a similar vein, Oliver and Atmore (1967) divide Africa into three 
regions based on analysis of colonial rule, paying special attention to the fiscal needs of 
the colonial governments and the ways of financing colonial administration and 
maintenance of law and order at a minimum cost to the metropolitan taxpayers. Their 
classification of countries is the same as Amin’s, with the exception of two countries. We 
follow Oliver and Atmore in placing Uganda and Tanzania in the cash crop economy 
category (see Table 1).  
Table 1 
Forms of Colonial Incorporation 
Type Countries 
Cash crop economies 
(enlarged West Africa) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda 
Africa of the concession companies 
(Congo Basin)  
Congo Kinshasa, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Central 
African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi 
Africa of the labour reserves 
(East and Southern Africa) 
Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Source: Constructed from the classification by , Oliver and Atmore (1967) and Samir Amin 
(1972) 
 
In the cash crop economies, production was left to peasants while marketing was 
dominated by metropolitan mercantile houses or, later, by state marketing boards that 
enjoyed monopsonistic positions in the economy. Taxation took place largely through the 
marketing channels and poll taxes. There were few restrictions on the movement of 
indigenous labour and on informal activities in the urban areas, although the movement of 
crops was highly regulated. The monopsonies that controlled the peasants were notorious 
for their exploitative pricing (Bauer 1954). Significantly, the case for paying low 
commodity prices to peasants was often made on the basis of a version of ‘vent for 
surplus’ theory, which sought to explain the extraction of surplus from the colonies 
without any major prior investment by colonial capital (Myint 1958). This conjured an 
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image of natives wallowing in unwanted leisure until colonial trade opened up outlets for 
surplus.  
In the Africa of the concession companies, the colonial power gave private companies 
concessions on vast tracks of land, for the production of crops on large plantations or for 
mineral extraction
3. The Belgian Congo is the iconic example of an economy ‘that 
depended on taxation and plunder instead of production and investment’ (Rodney 1990: 
358). It was based on the big role of great economic trusts, the concentration of political 
functions in the metropole, Mining, rather than plantation concessions, became the most 
important activity in most of these countries. These economies relied on forced labour up 
until late in their imperial days and there was virtually no development of peasant 
commercial farming encouraged (Betts 1990;Coquery-Vidrovitch 1990;Rodney 1990). 
Ruanda-Urundi was an extension of this type of economy
4. As Kenneth Good observes, 
although there were White settler communities in these countries, their status differed 
substantially from those of the labour reserve economies both in terms of  their political 
clout internally and the absence of a petit colon class’ (Good 1976: 598).  
The third category of colonial economies in Africa was the labour reserve economy, often 
associated with racial segregation, migrant labour and the ubiquitous townships or 
locations. The “White Economy” drew on labour reserves for its labour requirements and  
and used them for the disposal of unwanted labour (Meillassoux 1981;Phimister 
1974;Van Onselen 1976). One characteristic of such economies was a  by  far larger 
White settler population as a percentage of the total as compared to cash crop economies 
(See Appendix 1) . The labour reserves were sometimes within the economies themselves 
(as was the case in Angola, Kenya, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe) or 
were whole countries assigned that role by the colonial division of labour (pre-diamond 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) (Mogalakwe 2006). In some cases the various forms 
of market incorporation took place within the same economy. Thus while the southern 
part of Mozambique had the characteristic features of a labour reserve economy, the 
central part was much more akin to the Africa of concessions (Hinderink and Sterkenburg 
1987). In Malawi there was similar ambiguity, as settler agriculture relied on indigenous 
labour for its cash crop production and peasant farming for ‘wage food’ (Mandala 2006).  
Two features of labour reserve economies were their highly dualistic formal labour 
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market and a migrant labour system that tied large numbers of peasants to the ‘enclaves’ – 
national or regional –  of White-owned mining industry and plantation agriculture (Mhone 
2000). Indigenous populations were basically confined to employment in White farms or 
industry. To ensure low reservation wages for the native population, measures were taken 
to block alternative sources of income that might compete with the wage economy. These 
measures included disruption of peasant agriculture, job discrimination, criminalisation of 
informal activities by Africans in the urban areas, political regimentation of African, 
migration control. Etc. As the cash crop economies used the ‘vent for surplus’ argument 
to justify low commodity prices, the labour reserve economies had their own theoretical 
justifications for low remuneration of indigenous labour. ‘The backward-bending supply 
curve’ or the ‘target worker’ hypothesis suggest that, given an underlying preference for 
leisure, indigenous labour would reduce its supply beyond a certain wage rate (Moore 
1955)
.. 
The usual caveat that none of these economies exactly fit these ideal types holds here. We 
believe, however, that this classification does capture the fundamental categories of 
experience in the sub-Saharan region of Africa and serves adequately as a heuristic 
framework, even in light of  the caveat about its taxonomic accuracy. These 
characteristics produced a number of political economic features that have had a long-
lasting impact on both levels and structures of taxation. First there are significant 
differences in structure of taxations between these two economies. The non-labour reserve 
economies tend to rely more on trade taxs than the labour reserve reserves, which in turn 
have higher domestic taxes and depend more on direct taxes (See table 2). Second, and 
closely related to the levels and strucrure of taxation, were three political economy 
feature: (1) state capacity; (2) levels of formalisation and informalisation of the economy; 
and (3) levels of inequality.  
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Table 2 














Labour Reserve Economies         
Angola 32.08 4.73 12.82 10.24 71.34  18.42
Botswana 34.34 15.32 56.30 20.47 47.76  31.78
Kenya 18.75 17.10 17.96 14.69 29.38  50.68
Lesotho 32.49 50.10 16.67 16.30 16.93  66.76
Madagascar 9.19 43.24 24.27 20.46 14.96  67.81
Malawi 16.87 16.06 34.79 14.43 50.19  35.38
Mozambique 10.52 17.30 47.77 13.52 18.38  68.11
Namibia 25.78 30.96 25.36 10.98 26.62  56.79
South Africa  23.14 3.62 34.33 7.01 54.26 38.51
Swaziland 26.28     5.89 28.65  65.47
Zambia 18.23 30.08 32.56 4.93 32.38  62.64
Zimbabwe 23.13 10.91 36.15 9.13 46.66  44.22
Average 22.57 21.76 30.82 12.34 36.46  50.55
          
Non-Labour Reserve Economies        
Benin 11.67 50.96 17.05 19.01 26.11  69.36
Burkina Faso  9.36 33.61 33.15 12.99 20.95  64.18
Burundi 15.20 24.33 38.27 19.71 22.53  62.97
Cameroon 13.56 16.03 36.37 12.41 30.67  53.15
Central African Republic  7.89 31.71 35.40 10.43 22.46 67.11
Chad 5.75 13.46 11.78 15.67 17.89  36.57
Congo 22.27 10.44 21.58 15.35 52.22  32.38
Congo. Democratic 
Republic 
5.34 23.76 26.58 29.66 27.29 50.34
Cote d Ivoire  16.86 34.72 28.13 19.84 20.32  60.92
Gabon 11.71 20.25 10.77 16.95 13.53  33.70
Gambia The  17.98 42.89 12.32 22.58 18.52  71.20
Ghana 14.15 25.90 36.33 14.13 22.09  62.83
Guinea 11.57 13.53 31.53 6.83 7.71  85.46
Guinea-Bissau 3.80 18.77 42.87 94.56 9.40  18.39
Mali 11.89 38.54 24.55 22.66 15.33  64.01
Mauritania 16.35 29.77 18.05 30.31 23.57  45.66
Niger 8.15 42.62 19.03 27.67 25.20  61.65
Nigeria 18.85 9.67 6.90 44.88 38.08  16.52
Rwanda 9.89 31.83 39.63 56.12 24.79  72.14
Senegal 15.83 22.08 49.87 10.24 22.75  67.01
Sierra Leone  8.73   17.34 5.06 22.45  66.29
Tanzania 11.36 25.15 28.58 8.66 31.86  53.73
Togo 15.23 37.79 14.92 14.32 31.47  52.79
Uganda 8.51 49.80 28.68 7.31 14.21  78.48
Average 11.67 50.96 17.05 19.01 26.11  69.36
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1.1 State capacity  
One aspect of the political capacity of the state is its legitimacy and the ‘quasi-voluntary 
compliance’ it induces among taxpayers (Levi 1988). Settler economies were virtually 
‘war economies’ because one major preoccupation of communities with minorities 
dominating vast majorities is security. This state of affairs produced in the minds of the 
denizens of the enclave a ‘laager mentality’, and the need for the construction of strong 
state apparatus for both administration and security. In the case of South Africa, 
Lieberman attributes the acceptance of high personal taxes to race-based allegiances 
between the state and economic elites: ‘Construction of a racial union in South Africa led 
to high levels of inter- and intra-class solidarity, which in turn motivated upper groups to 
pay, whereas an officially non-racial federation in Brazil led to inter-class polarization, 
intra-class fragmentation, and, ultimately, resistance to tax payment.’ (Lieberman 2003: 
59). In such situations the minority entered a Faustian bargain with the state: in exchange 
for security, citizens allowed political elites considerable autonomy which allowed room 
to impose high taxes or persuade the privileged settler community to accept higher taxes. 
The threat of potential uprising by oppressed racial groups enhanced the autonomy of the 
state to extract more from those it would protect. The private sector was also willing to 
finance such states if only because they delivered cheap labour and access to other 
resources controlled by the state
5. All this has partly accounted for settlers’ willingness to 
pay high income taxes for their security and welfare benefits because the state was ‘their’ 
state (Bell and Bowman 2002).  
In trying to ‘maintain civilised standards’ or to keep up with ‘mother country’, the White 
settlers created highly interventionist states that supported industrialisation and 
agricultural development
6. Thus in the dominant settler economies, some kind of 
‘developmental state’ emerged. Such a state sought to systematise the incorporation of the 
labour reserve economies through labour recruitment institutions, ‘Bantustanisation’, 
customs unions and even federation, as in the case of The Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (Belcher 1979;Nattrass 1991;Phimister 1991). One should also add that there 
was a kind of nationalism among settlers that insisted ‘that their money be used to 
develop their own economy rather than lent out at low rates of interest to the British 
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borrower’ (Good 1976)
7. Furthermore, in the cases where White labour enjoyed some 
political rights (as in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) a White ‘welfare state’ 
emerged as part of the process of giving legitimacy to the racial order. This was 
reinforced by the ‘laager mentality’ that produced sentiments of solidarity that 
underpinned the racist welfare states that emerge
8.  
The provision of welfare services and the developmentalist imperatives of the social order  
necessitated a large state. In addition the regimentation of native life  and the management 
of the labour reserve areas also required a much more interventionist policies towards 
“native authorities”, as traditional authorities were labeled. Not surprisingly the “native” 
areas were managed in a much more direct manner than was the case in the cash crop 
economy
9. All these exigencies of the labour reserve economies were bound to render the 
revenue imperative quite high and lead to larger bureacracies to implement state policies, 
administer law and order, and actually collect revenue. Although the figures in Appendix 
2 are 20 or years into independence they show that labour reserve economies generally 
have more civil servants per 100 citizens than both cash crop economies. The figures for 
concession economies are also high, but this is partly attributable  to the two outliers—
Congo and Gabon—both major oil producers.  
1.2 Levels of formalisation and informalisation 
 
The reach of the state is facilitated by the extent to which the economy is formalized. 
Generally, levels of informalisation are much lower in labour reserve economies than in 
cash crop economies. A high level of informalisation of an economy provides ‘exit 
options’ that can undermine the state’s tax efforts. Data on the informal sector in Africa 
are hard to come by, but Appendix 3 is indicative of the sharp differences in the degree of 
informalisation between these two types of economies. As we noted above self-
employment and spontaneous settlement by natives in urban areas or around commercial 
farms of the labour reserve economies were not allowedwere  serverely restricted by 
various mechanisms of ‘influx control’, the most notorious of these being the ‘pass 
system’. In addition there were tight controls of small businesses. Many of the small 
enterprises that elsewhere were in the informal sector were formalised and reserved for 
Whites, and were thus registered and subjected to taxation. One consequence of this is the 
low level of informalisation in the labour reserve economies when compared to other 
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African countries. Restrictions on the informal sector not only make it administratively 
easy to collect tax, but can also positively affect tax morale in the formal sector, 
especially if taxation is not accompanied by redistributive policies that might benefit the 
denizens of the informal sector. Raising barriers to entry can be consistent with a 
deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power for 
those permitted to function in the protected sector, and hence rents (Auriol and Warlters 
2002). The rents can then be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees 
and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost. Not surprisingly, the postcolonial state 
may also seek to maintain some barriers against informalisation—and indeed most of 
them did so, until economic liberalisation under structural adjustment reforms forced 
them to remove or relax them. In addition, the spatial distribution of population into 
townships that ensured the ‘governability’ of indigenous populations tendedto be 
maintained as the new elite moved into the hitherto exclusive but now de-racialised 
‘White areas’. The new elite found  the separation between these areas and the townships 
congenial and necessary for the ‘maintenance of standards’. 
1.3 Differences in levels of inequality 
One other distinctive feature of the labour reserve economies is the high level of 
inequality. As Figure 1 shows, labour reserve economies had an average Gini coefficient 
higher than 0.50, while the cash crop economies had around 0.45. There is considerable 
controversy over the relation between inequality and taxation. In the ‘median voter’ 
models of taxation, based on the (unrealistic) assumption that the pivotal agent in society 
is the median voter, it is postulated that high inequality will lead to higher taxes because 
the majority will push for redistributive taxation and expenditure (Persson and G.Tabellini 
1993). The empirical basis and the political veracity of this hypothesis have proved rather 
thin (Benabou 1996). For one the model is premised on democratic institutions that would 
give simple majority power to make major changes in fiscal policy. As noted above, in 
the case of the settler economies, high taxation was accepted precisely because there were 
no redistributive expenditures outside the confines of the settler enclave. Significantly, 
greater inequality in Africa leads to higher tax share and most labour reserve economies 
have higher tax shares than would be predicted by their Gini coefficient (Figure 1). 
 
11 Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2010:10 
Figure 1 
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In the labour reserve economies Whites paid income taxes while natives were confined to 
‘poll taxes’ or to service user charges. In such an order it was important to ensure that 
none of the tax collected from Whites ‘leaked’ to other sections of the population. The 
segregation of local authorities in these economies ensured that there was no transfer of 
revenue among the various racial groups (Bell and Bowman 2002). Since industry was in 
‘White areas’, the revenue from it went to Whites. Thus in South Africa, in the aggregate, 
more than 90% of total revenues of local government serving Africans came from their 
own sources (Fjeldstad and Rakner 2004). In this way the usual progressive nature of 
direct taxes was attenuated as ‘dualism’ and enclavity of the settler economy ensured little 
leakage of incomes from one sector to the other. Consequently while the tax structure was 
redistributive among Whites, partly explaining the fact that intra-racial inequality was 
much less pronounced, it was not redistributive in the aggregate. This feature of the tax 
system remains after liberation or independence and may explain why while interracial 
inequality has often been reduced , intra-racial inequalities have increased. 
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As a consequence of all this, at independence, labour reserve economies had more 
elaborate state structures, higher levels of regulatory reach and formidable repressive 
capacity. And more pertinent to this paper, fairly elaborate tax collection mechanisms 
were in existence in these counties. As a consequence, labour reserve economies have a 
much higher share of tax revenue to GDP than cash crop and concession economies (See 
Table 2). In addition there are significant differences in the structure of taxation between 
these two types of economies. The cash crop economies rely much more on trade taxes 
than the labour reserve economies, which in turn have high domestic taxes and depend 
more on direct taxes than their cash crop economy counterparts. This might also partly 
explain the higher levels of direct taxation in labour reserve economies: such taxes are 
more difficult to collect and are generally associated with greater levels of state capacity 
(Zolt and Bird) and have been attributed by some to the persistence of institutions that 
underpinned the racist regimes, especially in South Africa and Zimbabwe. For neo-
institutionalists this greater capacity to collect taxes would simply be confirmation that 
White settler economies had better institutions, which were then bequeathed to the post-
colonial state (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). 
The other side of the labour reserve economy was, of course, the types of resistance by 
indigenous populations and the nationalist responses it provoked. Labour reserve 
economies tended to produce much stronger and more broad-based nationalist movements 
which could ride, for years after liberation, on the popularity of having dislodged a racist 
order. The nationalism that sustained the struggle for liberation was often strong enough 
to give the new state broad powers in terms of taxation and redistribution. Independence 
meant deracialisation of these tax systems, and their extension (together with higher 
incomes) to the new Black middle class and workers in the formal sector. This process of 
deracialisation legitimised the existant tax structure in the eyes of the newly liberated 
racial groups (Lieberman 2002). In most cases, there were attempts to extend the 
hitherto racial welfare state to indigenous people (Mhone 2004;Nattrass and Seekings 
2001).The new agenda may not have been as radical as suggested in the movements’ 
manifesto during the struggle for liberation, but it often required considerable state 
expenditure to meet some of the nationalist promises
10. This in, turn, led to an 
appreciation or harnessing of the administrative and control mechanisms bequeathed them 
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by the settler regime. All this also led to the reversal of opposition to various taxes 
imposed by the settler regime on Africa
11.  
 
2. Empirical Model and Data 
2.1 Data Sources 
The definition of all the data used in the analysis including the dummy variables are 
explained in Table 3.  The Table also include the sources of the data.  As most of the data 
is quite volatile, we reduce the noise by dividing the data into five four year-averages 
between 1984-2004, a standard procedure in this kind of studies. We have only included 
countries from continental sub-Saharan Africa. For these countries inclusion in the 
analysis is determined by data availability. 
14 Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2010:10 
Table 3 
Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable   Description  Source 
AGRI  Agriculture as share of gross domestic product  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
 AIDt-1  Aid as percentage of gross national income  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
CONFLICT  Unity if there is a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths 
per year and per incompatibility. It is zero otherwise 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset v.4-
2007 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
2007) 
FRANCZONE  Members of CFA Monetary Zone where unity belongs 
to the CFA zone and zero otherwise 
 
DEBTSHARE  Share of debt service in gross national income  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
DEPEND  Dependency ration – share of population under 15 and 
over 65 years in total population 
World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
EXPORT  Share of exports in gross domestic product  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
INDUS   Industry as share of gross domestic product  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
INFLATION  Inflation  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
LOGCAPt-1 
 
Log of per capita income in constant 1995 US$  Calculated by author 
LOGPOPDENSE  Log of population density (per square kilometre)  Calculated by author 
TAXSHARE  Tax revenue as share of gross domestic product  World Bank Africa Database 2006 
RESERVE  Dummy variable, which takes the value unity if the 
country is classified as a reserve labour economy, and 
zero if it is a cash crop economy (explained above) 
As classified by several authors in Table 1 
STATCAP  Unweighted average of government effctiveness  and 
rule of law indices 
As defined in (Kaufmann, et al. 2005) 
URBAN  Share of urban population in total population  World Bank Development Indicators 2006 
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Table 4 gives a summary of key variables used in various models. 
 
Table 4 
Summary of the Varibles  
Variable  Numbers of Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TAXSHARE  164  16.03 8.32 0.86 40.05
DEPEND  164  0.94 0.09 0.59 1.12
URBAN  164  31.18 14.45 5.04 83.29
EXPORT  164  29.58 18.17 4.04 91.60
INFLATION  163  30.73 140.78 -2.96 1757.70
DEBTSHARE  159.  105. 72.53 2.54 408.92
AGRI  164  28.30 14.22 2.42 58.89
INDUS   164  25.17 12.16 9.36 63.05
MANUF  162  10.37 5.35 2.31 32.34
AID  164  10.96 9.06 0.00 57.03
MINING  125  11.75 15.95 0.02 67.42
IMPORT  162  120.89 995.14 7.73 12705.13
LOGPOPDENSE  164 3.26 1.29 0.33 5.86
 
 
2.2 Empirical analysis 
A high tax ratio is not a good measure of a country’s tax capacity and does not 
necessarily mean that a country with high tax share is exerting itself more than one with a 
lower one. The higher share may be the result of ‘windfall gains’ or accounted for by 
favourable  structural variables or “tax handles” other than a government’s own efforts, 
with the consequence that a country with a higher tax ratio may actually be collecting less 
tax than is warranted by these structural determinants. A better index of a country’s 
performance is tax effort, which measures the relationship between actual and potential 
levels of taxation. This leads us to the central hypothesis, namely, that the status of labour 
reserve economy confers upon the countries enjoying that status more ‘tax handles’ than 
other economies  so that the often-observed higher tax share in these countries can be 
attributed to this historical fact and not any contemporaneous exertion on the part of the 
government of the day. More specifically the coefficient for the dummy variable proxying 
for the labour reserve economies is positive. 
In this paper we follow the various studies that use regression analysis in measuring the 
‘taxable capacity’ as the predicted value (Cheibub 1998;Davoodi and Grigorian 
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2006;Piancastelli 2001;Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam 1997;Teera and Hudson 2004). Tax 
effort is then defined as the ratio between actual tax share and the expected or predicted 
tax share. An index greater (less) than one suggests that a country is collecting more (less) 
than would be predicted given its economic structure. In early years, the seminal work on 
the tax effort literature used ordinary least square methods of analysis. In more recent 
years virtually all analyses of tax efforts use panel data analysis not only to exploit the 
increased number of observations that panel data sets provide but also for the statistical 
properties which combine both spatial and temporal dimensions of taxation, taking into 
account not only the heterogeneity of the countries but also the changes over time with 
each country. In line with this practice we model the following generic form: 
ε μ ψ δ β α it it it it it it it it it X R T + + + + + =  ........................................................ Equation 1 
 
where T is the share of tax in GDP, αit is the overall constant, Rit is-the regressor of chief 
theoretical interest, Xit is a vector of control variables consisting of proxies for possible 
tax bases and other factors that might affect a country’s ability to raise tax revenues, ψit 
is the time effect for each country , μi is the group effect for each county and εi,t is an 
unobserved random error term, where i = 1,2,…N are the cross-section units (in this case 
countries) and t = 1,2,…T are the periods We start with the model with fairly standard 
regressors and add more variables as we proceed: 
TAXSHAREit=β0+β1LOGCAPit+β2INDUSit+β3AIDit+β4EXPORTit+β5LOGPOPDEN
SEit+β6DEPENDit+β8URBAN+β9AGRIit+β10LOGPOPDENSE,t+ 
β11DEBTSHAREit +ψt +μit+ε it ................................................................................................................................................. (2) 
 
This model will be tested using different specifications and additional variables. We first 
conducted the Hausman Test to determine the choice between the fixed effect and the 
random effect model The test firmly favoured the latter
12. 
LOGCAP, which serves as the proxy for the level of development, is expected to be 
associated with a higher capacity to collect tax, ‘consistent with the idea that the ability to 
tax grows faster than income’ (Burgess and Stern 1993: 774) and higher demand for 
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public goods (Chelliah 1971;Wagner 1976). The coefficient of AIDt-1 is ambiguous in the 
literature, although it comes out negative in a significant number of studies. AGRI and 
INDUS are usually used as a proxies for structural change and level of modernisation of 
the economy. AGRI is expected to work negatively on tax collection because it proxies 
the difficulties involved in taxing the rural sector, especially in the developing countries. 
INDUS, in contrast`, should favour tax collection because it is much easier to tax the 
formal sector that is constituted by key industrial structures. Trade (EXPORT and 
IMPORT) is expected to favour taxation, as it is administratively much easier to control 
the flow of international goods, which explains why trade taxes play an important role in 
many developing countries (Tanzi 1987). In the literature it is suggested that since the 
amount of aid a country receives is likely to be affected by the fiscal position of the 
recipient as countries receiving high aid may be ones having problems mobilising 
domestic resources or faced with high indebtedness problems of endogeneity loom large. 
It is therefore suggested that aid should be entered in the equation with a lag in order to 
control for the possibility of endogeneity. (Gupta, et al. 2003;Morrissey, et al. 2007)
13. In 
much of the literature laaged aid (AIDt-1) has a negative coefficient. Its negative effects 
are attributed to the ‘aid dependence’ syndrome—a state of mind that induces aid 
recipients to lose their capacity to attain self-sufficiency. Some suggest that aid is subject 
to moral hazard, discouraging domestic effort by obviating domestic revenue mobilization 
(Bräutigam 2001;Ghura 1998;Remmer 2004)
14. Others suggest that aid undermines the 
administrative capacity of the state by shifting ‘ownership’ from national policy-makers s 
to foreign advisers or by overburdening local bureaucracies with onerous tasks and 
conditionalities.(Ali, et al. 1999;Azam, et al. 1999;Moss, et al. 2005). Aid might also 
weaken some tax handles by, for example, impairing export performance through adverse 
movements in the real exchange rate (so-called ‘Dutch Disease effects’) (Agbeyegbe, et 
al. 2004;Elbadawi 1999). Furthermore, some negative effects on tax revenue may be the 
intended consequences of policy conditionalities set by donors that require the removal of 
‘distortionary taxes’, especially those on trade (McGillivray and Morrissey 2001) or, 
more generally, the reduction of the size and reach of the state .
15 Urbanisation (URBAN) 
has ambiguous effects on taxation. On the one hand, concentration of both economic 
activities and population should facilitate taxation while, on the other, patterns of 
urbanisation may encourage informal activities (especially in the service and nontradable 
goods sectors) that are difficult to tax. Intuitively population density (LOGPOPDENSE) 
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should be positive because it makes tax collection easier, although it has also been 
suggested that population density leads to greater anonymity of citizens and may thus 
undermine tax effort. The dependence ration DEPEND is expected to increase demand for 
public provision of services such as education, health care and social security and will 
therefore tend to push tax collection upwards. DEBTSHARE has been hypothesised to 
have an ambiguous effect with some suggesting that  high public debt requires a higher 
revenue effort to service the debt while others suggest that a high debt burden can create 
macroeconomic instability and imbalances that would tend to reduce tax levels (Gupta, 
Clements, Pivovarsky, and Tiongson 2003). Because of the importance of mining in many 
African countries and the close association of the labour reserve economies with mining, 
in other specifications of the regression we replace INDUS with MANUF and MINING. 
The coefficient for MANUF is expected to be positive because of the relative ease of 
taxing the sector. The impact of MINING on revenue is ambiguous in the literature. On 
the one hand there is the view that the existence of formal and usually centralised 
production units and the export-orientation of the industry make the taxation of the 
mining sector relative easy (Chelliah). On the other hand they is the ‘Resource Curse’ 
literature that suggests a number of mechanism that may undermine the need and political 
will to tax the non-mining sector so that whatever gains are made from ease of taxing 
mining are more than compensated for by losses of revenues from other sectors (Collier 
2006;Moore 1998).  
Table 5 shows the results of the statistical analysis, with the second column containing the 
simple benchmark of a random effects specification. All in all we have 163 observations 
for 20 years divided into five four year period over the period 1984-2004  and from 35 
countries
16. When we replace INDUS with MANUF and MINING, we are left with 97 
observations derived from 28 countries for which data was available over the same period 
1984-2004
17. Virtually all explanatory variables have the expected signs. In Models 3 and 
5 we introduce the dummy RESERVE. Across all the models, the coefficient of 
LOGCAP is positive and significant and in some significantly so. INDUS is positive 
although not statistically significant. AIDt-1 is positive but not statistically significant. 
Both EXPORT and IMPORT are positive and statistically and highly significant in all 
specifications. LOGPOPDENSE is positive and significantly so. URBAN is ambiguous 
but not statistically significant in any of the specifications. The coefficient of AGRI is 
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negative though not significantly so in all specifications. In Models 4 and 5MINING is 
positive and, as we will see, remains so in all our other specifications in defiance of the 
predictions of the “Resource Curse” thesis. MANUF, in contrast, is negative, perhaps 
reflecting the ‘de-industrialisation’ and the privatisation schemes that took place in most 
countries during this period. Although DEBSHARE has the right sign, the coefficient is 
negligible. Most significantly for our analysis, the coefficient of our central variable, 
RESERVE, is positive and, statistically highly significant in all the three specification. 
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Determinants of Tax Share – Baseline Models (Dependent Variable: TAXSHARE) 
Variables   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
LOGCAP 3.450***  2.948** 1.603  5.339***  4.051*** 
  (3.861) (2.190) (1.226) (3.931) (3.460) 
AID t-1   0.0592  0.0551  0.0798*  0.0479 
    (1.510) (1.465) (1.732) (0.993) 
INDUS   0.0654  0.0654     
   (1.198)  (1.260)     
AGRI    -0.104* -0.0661 -0.0866 -0.0492 
    (-1.745) (-1.146) (-1.380) (-0.800) 
EXPORT   0.139***  0.137***  0.106** 0.0691* 
    (3.886) (4.039) (2.565) (1.769) 
IMPORT    0.0582** 0.0496** 0.103*** 0.113*** 
    (2.571) (2.281) (3.473) (4.074) 
DEBTSHARE   0.00712  0.00473  0.0111  0.00141 
    (1.037) (0.722) (1.460) (0.186) 
LOGPOPDENSE    1.185* 1.334**  1.146* 1.005** 
    (1.798) (2.182) (1.827) (2.176) 
DEPEND    -3.399 0.591  -4.255 2.362 
    (-0.602) (0.107)  (-0.717) (0.401) 
URBAN    -0.0639 0.0126  -0.0469 0.0225 
    (-1.126) (0.217)  (-0.793) (0.403) 
RESERVE  9.120***   7.229***   5.251*** 
  (4.913)   (3.716)   (3.595) 
MANUF       -0.134  -0.172** 
       (-1.596)  (-2.022) 
MINING       0.103**  0.121*** 
       (1.971)  (2.813) 
Constant  -7.631 -6.683 -8.065 -20.07 -21.12* 
  (-1.471) (-0.542) (-0.694) (-1.507) (-1.768) 
Observations 163  126  126  97  97 
Countries    35 35 35 28 28 
R-squared  . . . . . 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
z statistics in parentheses 
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In Table 6 we derive the tax efforts as defined above for Models 2 and 3. Recall that the 
tax equation is a performance measure. Consequently, countries whose tax effort is 
greater than expected will have a coefficient greater than one. Looking at the results of 
Model 2 in column 2, we see that the average tax effort of labour reserve economies is 
1.16 while that for the cash crop and concession economies is below 0.91. And even when 
we control for MINING, tax effort in the labour reserve economies still exceeds that of 
cash crop economies and is above one. This is in line with our earlier observations that in 
many tax effort studies high tax shares are associated with high tax efforts. When we 
control for RESERVE (column 3 and 5), the difference in tax effort between labour 
reserve economies and other economies is reduced or reversed. suggesting that the 
historical status of the labour reserve economies provides a significant ‘tax handle’ in 
itself, and once we control for it there is nothing special about the tax performance of 
labour. reserve economies in and Southern African economies, more specifically.  
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Table 6 
 Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan African Countries 






Tax Effort  
Model 5 
Labour Reserve Economies         
Angola 1.31  1.17  1.10  1.02 
Botswana 1.32  1.23  1.07  1.03 
Kenya 1.27  0.94  1.32  1.06 
Lesotho 1.39  1.27  1.29  1.23 
Malawi 1.07  0.80  1.21  0.99 
Mozambique 0.88  0.62  0.87  0.72 
Namibia 1.27  1.19  1.11  1.06 
South Africa  1.05  0.97  0.94  0.93 
Swaziland 0.77  0.74  0.77  0.80 
Zambia 1.11  0.84  1.21  1.02 
Zimbabwe 1.36  1.11     
Average 1.16  0.99  1.09  0.99 
        
Non-Labour Reserve 
Economies 
     
Benin 1.13  1.21  1.14  1.16 
Burkina Faso  0.88  1.08  0.95  1.00 
Burundi 1.43  1.64     
Cameroon 0.95  1.09  0.90  0.99 
Central African Republic  1.35  1.39  1.57  1.36 
Chad 0.61  0.75     
Congo 1.00  1.15  0.82  0.91 
Congo. Democratic Republic  0.87  0.80  1.11  0.95 
Cote d Ivoire  0.86  0.98  0.89  1.08 
Gabon 0.46  0.53     
Gambia The  0.79  0.92     
Ghana 1.00  1.06     
Guinea 0.71  0.85  0.66  0.73 
Guinea-Bissau 0.36  0.37     
Mali 1.23  1.38  1.25  1.25 
Mauritania 0.93  1.06  0.82  0.91 
Niger 0.93  1.12  1.10  1.07 
Nigeria 1.31  1.38  1.22  1.25 
Rwanda 0.71  0.83  0.83  0.96 
Senegal 0.97  1.07  1.00  1.10 
Sierra Leone  0.80  0.84  0.74  0.76 
Tanzania 0.92  1.08  0.95  1.08 
Togo 0.83  0.91  0.83  0.89 
Uganda 0.82  0.95  0.97  1.00 
Average 0.91  1.02  0.98  1.03 
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3. Robustness Tests 
 
To test the robustness of the results we proceed as follows. In the first part we change the 
model specification into a first order dynamic panel one to take into account the fact that 
rates of taxation tend to persist. We therefore include lagged TAXSHARE  
(TAXSHAREt-i) among the right hand variables. This recognition of inertia immediately 
raises the problem of serial correlation. In addition, the problem of heteroskedasticity is 
likely to arise as a result contemporaneous correlation across panels for African countries 
which are often simultaneously buffeted by the same forces such as changes in AIDt-1 
regimes, climate and terms of trade. Furthermore, there is the ‘contagion effect’ in the 
sense that in matters of taxation countries are likely to learn from their neighbours. 
Indeed, in our case the the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data rejects the no 
first-order correlation hypothesis while the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for 
random effects strongly rejects the homoskedasticity assumption.. To address some of 
these problems we resort to the panel-corrected standard error estimates to correct for 
serial correlation and contemporaneous correlation of observations between the panels
18. 
The results of additions to the baseline models are reported in Models 6 and 7 in Table 7. 
Most of the regressors behave as expected although LOGCAP is negative without being 
statistically significant.. Control for mining also gives us the expected results including 
for LOGCAP which is positive. More pertinent for the analysis is that RESERVE is still 
positive and statistically significant.  
As second stage in the exploration the the robustness of the results, we augment the 
baseline model with additional variables (including a measure for membership to CFA 
zone (FRANCZONE), conflict, and inflation that appear in the literature. With respect to 
taxation, Adam and associates (Adam, et al. 2000) show that the tax system of CFA 
countries appears to be more buoyant than that of non-CFA states. One possible 
explanation is that the convertibility of the CFA has reduced the black market. In the 
members of currency zone. FRANCZONE variable also serves as a control for the 
differences between British and French colonies, a much discussed divide. we 
hypothesise, therefore, that the coefficient for FRANCZONE is positive. One variable 
that takes on significant importance in Africa is conflict. The expected effect of 
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CONFLICT is ambiguous. On one hand, conflict can be so disruptive of structures of 
governance that large parts of the economy fall outside the reach of the state. This is 
particularly the case with revenue from natural resources, especially minerals (the 
‘Diamond Wars’ are an example). On the other hand there is the ‘bellicist’ view which 
extend to Africa Charles Tilly (1985) argument that predation and war increase the need 
for tax revenue and provides the state both the political basis and authority to tax its 
citizens (Herbst 1990;Thies 2005;2007)
19. Inflation (INFLATION) also has ambiguous 
effects, although it is frequently argued that for developing countries where inflation is 
often high and the collection lags are long, inflation may have a negative impact on tax 
effort (Burgess and Stern 1993). The results of this extended model are given in Models 
10, 11, 12 and13 in Table 7. First we note that the coefficient of TAXSHAREt-1 is 
positive and significant in all the models suggesting that there is persistence of tax 
revenue over time. LOGCAP is ambiguous while INDUS and MINING are both 
significantly positive. Once gain IMPORT and POPDENSE are also significantly 
positive. In all specifications, INFLATION has a negative sugn although the coefficient is 
negligible. The coefficient for FRANCOPGU+ONE is significantly negative in three 
specifications and positive only in but not significantly so. Significantly the coefficient for 
RESERVE is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. In other words the 
results for RESERVE are highly robust to the inclusion of additional variables and 
specifications. 
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Determinants of Tax Share: Accounting for Serial Correlation (PCSE)  
Dependent Variable: TAXSHARE 
 
VARIABLES  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Mode1 1l  Model 12  Model 13 
TAXSHAREt-1 0.675***  0.617***  0.479***  0.306***  0.669*** 0.637*** 0.461***  0.331*** 
 (6.475)  (5.206)  (4.531)  (3.476)  (6.193) (5.619) (4.322)  (3.732) 
LOGCAP -0.109  -0.245  2.303***  3.033*** 0.153  -0.00919  2.130***  2.933*** 
  (-0.170)  (-0.404)  (4.396) (4.586) (0.232)  (-0.0140) (3.876)  (3.852) 
AID t-1 0.00449  0.0126  0.0127  0.00462  0.0239 0.0326 0.0229  0.0274 
 (0.389)  (0.771)  (0.853)  (0.241)  (1.021) (1.234) (1.256)  (1.026) 
INDUS  0.121***  0.125***    0.0798  0.0836     
  (3.107)  (3.130)    (1.499)  (1.565)     
AGRI -0.0830  -0.0538  -0.111***  -0.0191  -0.0724 -0.0502 -0.0926***  -0.0162 
  (-1.363) (-1.016)  (-4.069) (-0.956) (-1.201)  (-0.887)  (-4.065)  (-0.804) 
EXPORT 0.0200  0.0329  0.00823  -0.0120  0.0155 0.0266 -0.00133  -0.0143 
  (1.080)  (1.629)  (0.278)  (-0.255)  (0.735) (1.351) (-0.0348)  (-0.295) 
IMPORT 0.0308**  0.0295**  0.101***  0.131*** 0.0333***  0.0317**  0.103***  0.125*** 
 (2.221)  (2.052)  (10.33)  (5.537)  (2.778) (2.572) (7.195)  (4.786) 
DEBTSHARE 0.000861  -0.00204  0.000271  -0.00612  -0.00291*** -0.00482*** -0.00886** -0.00956** 
  (0.494)  (-1.182)  (0.0602)  (-1.111)  (-2.924) (-4.739) (-1.992)  (-1.998) 
LOGPOPDENSE 0.445**  0.553*** 0.695***  0.873*** 0.426*  0.540***  0.665**  0.813*** 
 (1.963)  (2.646)  (2.617)  (3.259)  (1.897) (2.923) (2.478)  (3.603) 
DEPEND -1.916  0.256  2.401  11.87**  0.669 0.795 6.988  10.67** 
  (-0.640)  (0.0906)  (0.647) (1.983) (0.191)  (0.235)  (1.434)  (2.093) 
URBAN -0.0428  -0.0104  -0.00398  0.0952*** 0.000953  0.0209*  0.0634**  0.110*** 
 (-1.567)  (-0.631)  (-0.151)  (2.730)  (0.0616)  (1.869)  (2.557)  (4.080) 
RESERVE   2.116***    4.895***    1.835***    4.684*** 
   (3.424)    (6.439)    (4.193)    (7.064) 
MANUF      -0.213*** -0.206***     -0.189***  -0.197*** 
      (-5.576) (-7.793)     (-5.439)  (-6.688) 
MINING      0.0606***  0.101***    0.0547***  0.0839*** 
      (3.064) (5.757)     (2.855)  (3.985) 
CONFLICT       0.623  0.954**  -0.0311  0.693 
       (1.412)  (2.052)  (-0.0568)  (0.883) 
INFLATION       0.00528***  0.00486***  0.00572***  0.00442*** 
       (5.126)  (4.821)  (7.332)  (8.170) 
FRANCZONE       -1.109*  -0.488  -1.549***  0.142 
       (-1.921)  (-1.044)  (-2.981)  (0.290) 
Constant 5.321  1.892  -9.177  -28.04*** 1.140  -0.355  -13.39*  -26.92*** 
  (0.840) (0.322)  (-1.637) (-2.629) (0.198)  (-0.0647)  (-1.901)  (-2.656) 
Observations  126  126  97 97 126  126  97  97 
Countries 35 35  28 28 35  35  28  28 
R-squared 0.864  0.870  0.892  0.915  0.876 0.879 0.909  0.923 
Note: One asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level and two asterisk (**) indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level and three asterisk (***) indicated significance at one  
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In these extended models most of the variables behave as expected. Perhaps the most 
significant change is that of agriculture whose coefficient either remain negative but 
statistically insignificant or turns to positive but while remaining very small and 
insignificant. It is noteworthy that RESERVE is stronger and more significant when we 
control for mining, suggesting it is not the historical association of mining with Southern 
Africa that explains the differences in in the tax share.  
We present the tax efforts for the extended specification in Table 8. as we noted above in 
the literature on tax effort countries with high tax share in GDP also tend to have high tax 
effort. This does not seem to hold in the African case, especially when we control for 
RESERVE. In the Table 8 the tax efforts of labour reserve economies and those of cash 
economies are slightly higher or equal when do not control for RESERVE. However 
when we introduce RESERVE, the tax efforts of cash crop economies are decidedly 
higher, confirming the point made earlier. 
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Table 8 
Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan African Countries (Extended Models)  
COUNTRY  Tax Effort  
(Model ) 
Tax Effort* 
 (Model 7) 
Tax Effort  
(Model 8) 
Tax Effort*  
(Model 9) 
Tax Effort 
 (Model 10) 
Tax Effort* 
 (Model 11) 
Tax Effort  
(Model 13)  
Tax Effort * 
(Model 14) 
Angola  1.08 1.07 1.07 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.98
Botswana  1.04 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00
Kenya  1.08 1.00 1.11 0.98 1.05 1.01 1.07 1.00
Lesotho  1.10 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.09
Malawi  0.96 0.89 1.11 1.02 0.98 0.94 1.14 1.06
Mozambique  0.96 0.86 0.97 0.82 0.94 0.87 0.99 0.85
Namibia  1.11 1.11 1.05 1.04 1.10 1.11 1.05 1.05
South Africa  1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
Swaziland  0.89 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.89
Zambia  0.94 0.90 1.14 1.02 0.94 0.92 1.09 1.03
Zimbabwe  1.08 1.06 1.07 1.06 
Average  1.02 0.99 1.05 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.03 0.99
      
Benin  1.27 1.25 1.12 1.07 1.26 1.23 1.09 1.06
Burkina Faso  0.92 0.97 0.94 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.00 1.04
Burundi  1.11 1.18 1.11 1.15 




1.24 1.16 1.55 1.26 1.23 1.13 1.47 1.14
Chad  0.86 0.88 0.85 0.82 




1.21 1.10 1.35 1.06 1.03 1.01 1.10 1.04
Cote d Ivoire  0.94 0.97 1.00 1.12 0.97 0.98 1.06 1.11
Gabon  0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Gambia The  0.92 0.97 0.91 0.96 
Ghana  1.08 1.07 1.03 1.05 
Guinea  0.75 0.79 0.71 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.83
Guinea-
Bissau 
1.08 0.98 1.23 1.03 
Mali  1.20 1.21 1.13 1.14 1.21 1.20 1.18 1.12
Mauritania  0.90 0.94 0.85 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.82 0.93
Niger  0.95 0.98 0.97 1.06 1.00 1.01 1.07 1.04
Nigeria  1.85 1.77 1.59 1.43 1.81 1.78 1.48 1.45
Rwanda  0.85 0.87 0.93 1.01 0.80 0.82 0.88 0.97
Senegal  1.01 1.04 0.97 1.04 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99
Sierra Leone  0.94 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.93 0.95 0.88 0.89
Tanzania  0.98 1.00 0.98 1.10 0.92 0.97 0.92 1.10
Togo  0.86 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.86
Uganda  0.99 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.88 0.95
Average  1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03
* Indicated equations controlling for RESERVE 
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Let us  now turn to one final point that serves both as an additional test for the robustness 
of the results but also as a link to the more recent literature on tax efforts that includes 
institutions among its determinants (Bird, et al. 2004;Bräutigam and Knack 2004;Ghura 
1998;Gupta, Clements, Pivovarsky, and Tiongson 2003). We argued earlier that three 
features of labour reserve economies account for the higher performance of these 
economies in terms of tax collection: state capacity, politics and “tax morale”, degree of 
informalisation of the economy, income distribution and structure of income. 
Unfortunately, data on information and income distribution in Africa are too patchy to 
allow for panel data analysis. We only address the issue of state capacity. Recent studies 
in tax effort have included proxies of institutional capacity to capture the effect of 
citizen’s demand and the responsiveness of government. Thus Brautiugan and Knack 
(Bräutigam and Knack) and Richard Bird and associates (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Torgler 2004)  use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and combinations of 
several indices used by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005)  to 
construct their Quality of Governance Index, with special emphasis on aspects affecting 
private foreign investment decisions. Ghura (1998) and Gupta and  associates (Gupta, 
Clements, Pivovarsky, and Tiongson 2003)use a corruption index to proxy the quality of 
institutions We draw the World Bank governance indicators (Gupta, Clements, 
Pivovarsky, and Tiongson 2003) to construct a proxy, STATCAP, which, in light of our 
discussion above, is an unweighted average of government effectiveness and rule of law 
indices. STATCAP does not fully include the notion of state capacity discussed above 
which included the coercive capacity of the state. Nevertheless the correlation between 
RESERVE and STATCAP is 0.4026. The result in Table are not exactly comparable to 
those of the regression tables above. We retain the specification but are now confine to 
the years for which data on which we base STATCAP are available. The data available 
for STATCAP is for the years 1998 and 2002-2004. As in other studies using this 
institutional variable STATCAP is positive .When we control for RESERVE , the 
coefficient of STATCAP becomes more efficient . In other words the historical condition 
of being a labour reserve economy enhances the effectiveness of state capacity. Once 
again the sign of the coefficient for RESERVE is as predicted and still highly significant 
suggesting that even after we control  for state capacity as meacured here, the other 
feafutes of the labour reserve economy still exercise a positive impact on the tax ratio.   
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Table 9 
Determinants of Tax Share: Accounting for Serial Correlation (PCSE)  
Dependent Variable: TAXSHARE 
VARIABLES  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 7  Model 18  Model 19  Model 20  Model 21 
L.LOGCAP  -0.0321 0.0411  2.432*** 3.397***  0.622 0.303 3.124***  3.583*** 
  (-0.0223)  (0.0338) (7.718)  (4.718) (0.559) (0.301) (3.390)  (3.696) 
L.AID  -0.146 -0.155* -0.0255 -0.0258  -0.124** -0.132** 0.000623  0.00396 
  (-1.607) (-1.839)  (-0.484)  (-0.430) (-2.019) (-2.067) (0.00935) (0.0538) 
INDUS  0.268*** 0.295***      0.231*** 0.259***    





-0.143** 0.0225  -
0.126*** 
-0.0604 -0.127** 0.0185 
  (-15.43) (-2.974)  (-2.013)  (0.466)  (-4.032) (-1.286) (-2.355)  (0.598) 
EXPORT  0.117* 0.0989* 0.0152* -0.0188  0.122*** 0.111**  0.00838  -0.0164 
  (1.838) (1.663)  (1.759)  (-0.494)  (2.669) (2.478) (0.422)  (-0.409) 
IMPORT  0.0158 0.0211  0.171***  0.185***  0.0198 0.0222 0.174***  0.188*** 
  (0.512) (0.809)  (10.43)  (4.997) (0.793) (1.061) (7.601)  (4.901) 






  (1.974) (2.089)  (-2.563) (-2.557)  (1.717) (1.465) (-6.737) (-5.906) 
LOGPOPDENSE  0.183* 0.525***  0.334  0.863**  0.295 0.567**  0.343* 0.753*** 
  (1.703) (2.791)  (1.133)  (2.281) (1.581) (2.401) (1.718)  (3.027) 
DEPEND  -
22.81*** 
-10.90** -5.392** 15.05***  -
15.75*** 
-10.41** -0.403  11.53*** 










  (-16.85) (-18.51)  (-3.881)  (1.518)  (-15.56) (-15.66) (-1.279)  (2.513) 
STATCAP  3.068** 3.172**  2.428*** 2.748***  4.323** 4.466** 2.633*** 3.218*** 
  (2.088) (2.187)  (2.630)  (3.062) (2.257) (2.246) (2.919)  (3.097) 
RESERVE   4.515***    6.028***   4.096***    6.616*** 
   (34.33)    (34.19)   (14.42)    (5.968) 
MANUF     -0.195  -0.139    -0.243  -0.209 
     (-1.260)  (-1.337)    (-1.253)  (-1.616) 
MINING     0.178***  0.214***    0.115  0.162*** 
     (3.663)  (8.441)    (1.626)  (3.260) 
INFLATION        0.0354*  0.0292*  0.0426**  0.0279* 
        (1.931)  (1.816)  (2.049)  (1.825) 
CONFLICT        0.599  1.399*  1.114  2.275 
        (0.966)  (1.723)  (1.341)  (1.501) 
CURRENCY        -0.981  0.253  -0.750  1.460 
        (-1.461)  (0.458)  (-0.897)  (1.637) 
Constant  44.50*** 24.40**  9.227**  -
29.30*** 
31.45*** 21.39**  -0.934  -27.47*** 
  (3.135) (2.158)  (2.271)  (-3.297)  (3.002) (2.491) (-0.0854)  (-2.902) 
Observations  64 64  52  52 64 64 52  52 
Number of CID  33 33  27  27 33 33 27  27 
R-squared  0.797 0.819  0.877  0.913 0.822 0.835 0.902  0.930 
z statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
The paper is a reminder of ‘fiscal inertia’ that has been observed in different parts of the 
world (Webber and Wildavsky 1986). As a consequence of the so-called ‘ratchet effect’, 
taxes, once introduced, tend to stick long after the original argument for them is gone. The 
success of any particular type of taxation depends on the  inherited practices that 
constitute the “initial conditions” of the structure of the economy, degrees of formality of 
economic activities, on politics, etc.  Colonisation has left  institutional arrangements and 
practices that have proved remarkably resilient over the years. One such arrangement has 
been the structure and level of taxation. The colonial status of African economies has 
significant implications for taxation in African economies today close to half a century 
after 1960, the modal year of independence. We have argued that labour reserve 
economies have a higher tax share, in part, because of particular ‘tax handles’ they 
inherited from their colonial past. We suggested that these include state administrative 
and coercive capacity, low levels of informalisation of the economyand high levels of 
inequality We found that once these historical advantages or characteristics are accounted 
for the high tax ratios of labour reserves economies do not in fact suggest  high levels of 
‘tax efforts’ as is suggested in the literature. The result was found to be robust over a 
varied set of specifications This conclusion suggests that some of the observations about 
the ‘special case’ of South Africa are misleading: South Africa turns out to be quite 
‘normal’ in the context of labour reserve economies.  
It should be borne in mind that the inertia on taxation is only one side of the coin. Tax is 
closely related to expenditure not only in a simple accounting sense but in the more 
profound sense in that the tax-expenditure nexus signals the fundamental social values of 
society, the balance of social forces and the kind of ‘social contracts’ they have arrived at. 
No analysis of expenditure is made in this paper but a  possible conjecture is that 
expenditure patterns are likely to differ in African regions along the lines identified above, 
with urban and formal sector biases stronger in the labour reserve economies than in the 
other non-labour reserve economies. Furthermore within the urban and rural areas, the 
incidence of public expenditure will favour the formal sectors. One possible implication is 
that side by side with what may seem like progressive tax structures (as suggested by high 
levels of direct taxation)  there will be  highly regressive patterns of expenditure
20.  This 
may be an area for further exploration. 
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Appendix 1 
Settler Populations in Selected former British colonies, 1955 
Case  Settler population as 
percentage of total 
Labour reserve economies   
Lesotho  0.3 
Malawi  0.3 
Kenya  0.5 
Mauritius  0.9 
Botswana  1.0
Swaziland  1.4 
Zambia  3.0 
Zimbabwe  7.9 
Average  1.91 
   
   
Cash crop economies   
Gambia  0.1 
Ghana  0.1 
Nigeria  0.1 
Sierra Leone  0.1 
Uganda  0.1 
Tanzania  0.3 
Average  0.13 
Source: (Lange 2004.) 
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Appendix 2 
Number of Civil Servants per 100 citizens (average, 1986-1996) 
Country  Average (1986-1996)
Labour reserve economies   
Kenya  1.82 
Lesotho  1.51 
Madagascar  0.82 
Malawi  1.20 
Mozambique  0.80 
Zambia  1.41 
Zimbabwe  1.64 
Average  1.32 
   
Cash crop economies   
Benin  0.76 
Burkina Faso  0.39 
Cameroon  1.41 
Chad  0.43 
Côte d'lvoire  0.82 
Equatorial Guinea  1.63 
Gambia, The  1.08 
Ghana  1.96 
Guinea  1.08 
Guinea-Bissau  1.71 
Mali  0.38 
Mauritania  0.95 
Niger  0.46 
Senegal  0.87 
Sierra Leone  1.27 
Tanzania  1.18 
Togo  0.58 
Uganda  1.16 
Average  1.01 
   
African of concessions   
Burundi  0.47 
Central African Republic  0.72 
Congo  3.22 
Gabon  2.75 
Rwanda  0.47 
Average  1.79 
Source: (Lienert and Modi 1997) 
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Appendix 3 
Informal Economy Employment as a % of employment 
 
Country Year    Percentage
Labour Reserve Economies     
Botswana 1985  27.0 
Zimbabwe 1987  8.8 
South Africa  1999  21.3 
Average   19.0 
    
Cash Crop Economies     
Senegal 1991  76.7 
Cameroon 1993  57.3 
Gambia 1993  72.4 
Madagascar 1995  57.5 
Niger 1995  0.0 
Côte d'Ivoire  1996  52.7 
Mali 1996  71.0 
Ghana 1997  78.5 
Benin 1999  46.0 
Tanzania, 2001  46.0 
Uganda 1993  83.7 
Average   58.3 
    
African of concessions     
Congo 1984  36.5 
Central African Republic  1989  83.1 
Gabon 1989  27.2 
Average   48.9 
Source: (ILO 2003) 
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Appendix 4 
 Income Distribution  
   Survey year Richest 10% to 
poorest 10% 
Gini coefficient 
Labour reserve economies       
Botswana   1993  77.6  63.0 
Kenya   1997  13.6  42.5 
Lesotho   1995  105.0  63.2 
Malawi   1997  22.7  50.3 
Namibia   1993  128.8 70.7 
South Africa   2000  33.1  57.8 
Swaziland   1994  49.7  60.9 
Zambia   1998  41.8  52.6 
Zimbabwe   1995  22.0  56.8 
Average     54.9  57.5 
     
Cash crop economies       
Gambia   1998  20.2  47.5 
Ghana   1998  14.1  40.8 
Nigeria   1996  24.9  50.6 
Sierra Leone   1989  87.2  62.9 
Tanzania, U. Rep. of  1993  10.8  38.2 
Uganda   1999  14.9  43.0 
 Average     28.7  47.2 
Source: (UNDP 2006) 
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1 The idea of “tax handles” comes from the work by Richard Musgrave (1969) who emphasised the 
structure features of an economy that facilitates tax collection. 
2  Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam  (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam) seem to subscribe to geographical 
determinism of  tax effort, as they observe in passing that that ‘tropical African countries…tend to 
have low indices of tax effort’  (p. 35).  
3 As Samir Amin observes: ‘Here, ecological conditions had to some extent protected the peoples 
who took refuge from the ravages of the slave trade by fleeing into zones unlikely to be penetrated 
from the coast. The low population density and the lack of sufficient hierarchisation made the 
colonial trade model non-viable. Discouraged, the colonial authorities gave the country to any 
adventurers who would agree to try to ‘get something out of it’ without resources—since adventure 
does not attract capital.’ (Amin 1972: 117). 
The brutality of this order was first captured by Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darkness and in more recent 
years  has been chronicled in King Leopold’s Ghost (Adam 1998) 
4 The violence of these regimes showed up in the large numbers of Ruandi-Urundis that escaped to 
neighbouring countries to avoid forced labour. (Rodney 1990) 
5 There is a vast literature on the on the functional role of apartheid in the accumulation process and 
its acceptance by business precisely because of its role as a system of labour regimentation  (See 
especially Wolpe 1980) 
6 In the words of Kenneth Good ‘Colonial development of this kind implied the existence of a 
particularly active and interventionist state. If its basis was in the control of land and labour, its 
elaboration was influenced by the settlers' demands for goods and services similar to those in Britain, 
or the most advanced settler colonies outside of Africa. Because they were settlers, not just 
administrators, they took the long-term view of people preparing for the growth of established 
societies.’  (Good 1976: ) 
7 As a Rhodesian Minister of Agriculture stated the matter in March 1920: 
, “ cannot quite get over the fact of the huge profits the Trusts make out of the tobacco which we are 
trying to grow out here by the sweat of our brows, or perhaps I should say the natives'...The fact of 
Directors of the Trusts dying multi-millionaires... makes one wonder if they ever think of where all 
their money comes from and how it is that a few crumbs from their groaning tables are not let fall to 
enable the growers in Rhodesia, or in other parts of the world for that matter, to make a bare living... 
“  (cited in Phimister 1984: 279) 
8 Perhaps the most important distinction between the African settler economies and countries like 
Brazil and other African economies is that the former were able to minimize ‘leakages’ of tax revenue 
toward expenditures on the indigenous population.   Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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9 Colonial rule in the labour reserves was generally of the “direct rule” type asw opposed to “indirect 
rule” in which the colonial powers extensively used traditional authorities for the implementation of 
some of their policies..  Thus using the data in Matthew Lange’s study (Lange 2004.) on the effect of 
indirect rule on various indicators of governance in Ex-British colonies, we see that with the 
exception of Malawi, all our labour reserve economies score low on his index of extent of ‘ indirect 
rule’.  
10 On the construction and trajectories of nationalist agenda  see (Mkandawire 1999;2009) 
11 For a while the nationalist movements in South Africa had to contend with their own creation of 
resistance to taxation in attempts to make the townships ungovernanable as township dwellers 
continued with boycott of taxes on services.  
12   The test yielded a value 19.18 and   Prob>chi2 =   0.0237 suggesting the random effects model is 
the more appropriate one.  
13 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
14 Thus Brautigam and Knack (2004: 263) argue that ‘political elites have little incentive to change a 
situation in which large amounts of aid provide exceptional resources for patronage and many fringe 
benefits’. 
15 World Bank economists (Devarajan, et al. 1999) suggest, for instance, that if the marginal cost of 
taxation is exceptionally high—which it might be in African countries—using aid for tax relief may be 
the best use of foreign resources. Gupta and associates (Gupta, Clements, Pivovarsky, and Tiongson 
2003: 20) note: “In some countries, the dampening effect of aid on revenues could be part of a 
strategy to return resources to the private sector to accelerate economic growth”  
16  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Congo. Democratic Republic, Cote d Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia The, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
17  These countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Congo. Democratic Republic, Cote d Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia,  
18 We use the xtpcse command in STATA.  
19 Using regressions methods in the form used in this paper Thies concludes: 
‘The existence of an interstate rivalry results in higher levels of extraction from society in African 
states. Internal  ethnic rivals engaged in conflict with the state also result in the capture of a larger 
percentage of the national income through taxation. These findings generally conform to predatory 
theory that expects states would expand their extraction in order to face these types of challenges’  
(Thies 2005;2007: 728) 
20 This is strongly implied by Sue Bowden, Blessing Chiripanhura and Paul  Mosley (2008) in a paper 
comparing poverty in ‘settler economies’  and ‘peasant economies’.  Former Working Papers: 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:1- 2008:15, se www.framtidsstudier.se. 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:1 
Enström Öst, Cecilia, The Effect of Parental Wealth on Tenure Choice. A study of family 
background and young adults housing situation 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:2 
Gartell, Marie, Unemployment and subsequent earnings for Swedish college graduates. A 
study of scarring effects 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:3 
Bergman, Ann & Jan Ch Karlsson, Från shopping till sanningsserum. En typologi över 
förutsägelser 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:4 
Amcoff, Jan; Möller, Peter & Westholm, Erik, När lanthandeln stänger. En studie av 
lanthandelns betydelse för flyttning in och ut och för människorna i byn 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:5 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, The Emergence of Foresight Activities in Swedish Government 
Authorities 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:6 
Thalberg, Sara, Childbearing of students. The case of Sweden 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:7 
Baroni, Elisa; Žamac, Jovan & Öberg, Gustav, IFSIM Handbook 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:8 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, Socialt kapital och karteller 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier: 2009:9 
Hernández Ibarzábal, José Alberto, Energy policy and regulatory challenges in natural gas 
infrastructure and supply in the energy transition in Sweden 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:10 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, Strategisk omvärldsanalys vid myndigheter 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:11 
Minas, Renate, Activation in integrated services?. Bridging social and employment services in 
European countries 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:12 
Bohman, Samuel, Omvärldsanalys i statliga myndigheter. Framväxt, organisation och 
arbetsmetoder 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:13 
Blomqvist, Paula & Larsson, Jakob, Towards common European health policies. What are the 
implications for the Nordic countries? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:14 
Elowsson, Maria, Service utan lokal närvaro?. Förändringar av statlig direktservice i Dalarnas 
län under 2000-talet  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:15 
Ström, Sara, Housing and first births in Sweden, 1972-2005 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:16 
Gartell, Marie. Stability of college rankings. A study of relative earnings estimates applying 
different methods and models on Swedish data 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:17 
Alm, Susanne. Social mobilitet och yrkestillfredsställelse – spelar mamma och pappa någon 
roll? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:18 
Hallberg, Daniel. Balansen mellan de unga och de gamla. Intergenerationella 
resursomfördelningar och en åldrande befolkning 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:19 
Johannesson, Livia. Könsperspektiv inom framtidsstudier. En studie av tidskriften Futures: the 
journal of policy, planning and futures studies 1968-2008 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:20 
Nilsson, Anders & Estrada, Felipe. Kriminalitet och livschanser. Uppväxtvillkor, brottslighet och 
levnadsförhållanden som vuxen ISSN: 1652-120X 
ISBN: 978-91-85619-71-9 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2009:21 
Östh, John; van Ham, Maarten & Niedomysl, Thomas. The geographies of recruiting a partner 
from abroad. An exploration of Swedish data 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:1 
Meagher, Gabrielle & Szebehely, Marta. Private financing of elder care in Sweden. Arbuments 
for and against 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:2  
Niedomysl, Thomas & Amcoff, Jan. Is there a hidden potential for rural population growth in 
Sweden? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:3 
Gartell, Marie. The College-to Work Transition during the 1990s. Evidence from Sweden 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:4 
Esser, Ingrid & Ferrarini, Tommy. Family Policy, Perceived Stress and Work-Family Conflict. A 
Comparative Analysis of Women in 20 Welfare States  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:5 
Baroni, Elisa. Effects of Sharing Parental Leave on Pensioners’ Poverty and Gender Inequality 
in Old Age. A Simulation in IFSIM 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:6 
Korpi, Martin & Abbasoğlu Ösgören, Ayse. Does Immigration Hurt Low Income Workers?. 
Immigration and Real Wage Income below the 50
th Percentile, Sweden 1993-2003  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:7 
Montanari, Ingalill & Nelson, Kenneth. Health Care Developments in EU Member States. 
Regressing Trends and Institutional Similarity? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:8 
Kumlin, Johanna. Har kvinnor och män blivit mer jämnt fördelade över yrken, organisationer 
och arbetsplatser i Sverige under perioden 1990-2003? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2010:9 
Minas, Renate. (Re)centralizing tendencies within Health Care Services. Implementation of a 
new idea? 